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1 Introduction
Unemployment rates in Japan have skyrocketed since the mid-1990s. Not only young
unskilled workers but also middle-aged male workers have been laid off. These middle-
aged workers are often the main income earners in a household. How have Japanese
households reacted to these changes? This paper examines their reactions to husbands’
involuntary job loss, focusing on wives’ labor supply.
When a household’s main income earner loses a job, other household members might
supply more labor either sequentially or simultaneously to compensate for the job loss.
This is called the Added Worker Effect and has been examined in several countries. Heck-
man and MacCurdy (1985) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1968
to 1975 to show that the wife participates more in labor markets when the husband is
unemployed. In contrast, Lundberg (1985) and Cullen and Gruber (2000) show that the
added worker effect may exist but is quite small in the United States. Spletzer (1997)
shows that there is the added worker effect in the United States, but that this is largely ex-
plained by unobservable heterogeneity between wives whose husbands have lost their jobs
and wives whose husbands have not. The heterogeneity causes an endogeneity between
the husband’s unemployment and the wife’s labor supply. Bingley and Walker (2001)
take this endogeneity into consideration and show that the added worker effect is small
but that it becomes large when the husband’s unemployment period is long. Stephens
(2002) emphasizes the use of involuntary job loss as an exogenous employment shock and
shows that the wife’s labor supply does not react promptly to the husband’s involuntary
job loss. Fernandes and Felicio (2005) finds that the added worker effect exists in Brazil,
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focusing on non-working wives’ reaction to their husbands’ unexpected job loss.
The fact that wives flexibly change their labor supply might be surprising. Despite
the huge research on household behavior, much of it neglects households’ leisure/labor
decisions and concentrates on consumption behavior. For example, many empirical in-
vestigations have examined whether households’ consumption responds to idiosyncratic
shocks (e.g. tests of the applicability of the life-cycle permanent income and full insur-
ance hypotheses). There is little empirical research that deals with both consumption and
leisure at the same time.1
The present paper clarifies whether or not household’s members change their labor
decisions in response to unexpected shocks surrounding them. In order to examine this,
we focus on the existence of surplus labor and its reaction to shock experienced by main
income earners. That is, the first purpose of our paper is to reexamine the existence
of the added worker effect. Empirical analysis on the added worker effect has some
difficulties such as lack of detailed information on wives’ working hours, their working
history, households’ savings/consumption patterns, and causes of husbands’ job loss. We
utilize panel data containing extensive household information so that we can specify a
better estimation model.
Another purpose of the paper is to clarify the existence of the added worker effect in
Japan. We not only use Japanese household data but also highlight the period when the
1Exceptionally, Low (2005) and Pijoan-Mas (2006) describe an individual’s life-cycle labor supply
behavior with precautionary motive, and shows that one can change labor supply flexibly in response
to his/her uncertainty as well as wages. Attanasio et al. (2005) simulate the changes in consumption,
savings and wives’ labor supply in relation to income uncertainty, and find that female labor supply is
responsive to idiosyncratic shocks especially in those households with borrowing constraints.
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added worker effect could exist if there is any in this country. That is, our sample period
(1993–2004) includes the period when Japan’s unemployment rate increased dramatically
and stayed at a high level.
It is important to examine the existence of the added worker effect in Japan for four
reasons. First, as mentioned in the last paragraph, Japan has experienced a sharp rise in
unemployment and a dramatic change in the employment atmosphere in the past decade,
which provides us with a suitable context in which to examine the changes in households’
economic behavior such as labor supply and consumption. We can add another result to
the existing arguments on the added worker effect.
Second, Japan is famous for having a large proportion of women who are housewives,
especially among wealthy households. Many women become housewives after marriage or
at least after having a child. It is interesting to observe how Japanese labor-risk-sharing
within a household has changed (or not changed) after about a three-percentage-point
rise in middle-aged male unemployment. Third, Japan is known for its households’ high
saving rates. As drawing down savings could be one way to cope with the main earner’s
job loss, the level of savings can make a difference to a household’s labor-risk-sharing. The
Japanese data may reveal interesting differences from other countries’ results. Fourth, so
far there have been no tests of the added worker effect for Japanese households, while there
is research examining the negative relationship between the wife’s labor force participation
and the husband’s income (see Higuchi (2001), for example). The present paper is the
first attempt to clarify the existence of the added worker effect in Japan.
Our empirical investigation shows that wives’ labor supply was indeed stimulated by
the husbands’ involuntary job loss in Japan between 1993 and 2004. The detailed statistics
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suggest not only that working wives raised their work hours, but also that nonworking
wives came to participate in the labor market. Moreover, we find that nonworking wives
started seeking work after their husbands lost their jobs. Clearly the added worker effect
was present during the high unemployment period in Japan following the mid-1990s. The
effect could become large if we counted potential labor supply.
The rest of the paper consists of four sections. Section 2 explains the theoretical
background and the empirical model. Section 3 introduces the data used in the empirical
analysis. Section 4 presents the estimation results. The final section concludes the paper.
2 The Background Theory and the Estimation Model
The explanation of the added worker effect (hereafter, AWE) is descriptive, but the un-
derlying theory is summarized as a form of risk-sharing behavior within a family. A family
that maximizes their expected life time utility subject to their life time constraints faces
an intertemporally optimal condition such that today’s leisure and consumption equate to
the discounted present values of future leisure and consumption as long as the marginal
utility, which is expected lifetime wealth, is unchanged over time. The so-called Euler
equations imply that a rational household does not react to temporary shocks while they
may react to unexpected permanent shocks. This smoothing behavior is a central hy-
pothesis to be tested by the evidence of a simple life-cycle permanent income hypothesis.
A household also faces intratemporally optimal conditions such that the marginal
utility of leisure weighted by wage equals the marginal utility of consumption, and that this
weighted marginal utility of leisure is equal between the wife and the husband. The wife’s
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optimal leisure/labor decision depends on complementarity or substitutability between
leisure and consumption, and between the husband’s and the wife’s leisure time.2
Thus, when the husband unexpectedly loses his job and family income decreases, the
wife may raise her labor supply, partly as a reaction to unexpected permanent shocks
and partly as complementarity between the husband’s and the wife’s leisure time.3 The
literature on the AWE focuses on the shock of job loss or the displacement of the main
income earner, and examines the response of surplus labor in a family. Because the main
income earner is usually the husband, the question to be answered is whether or not wives
2Household’s maximization problem is summarized as
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(k = 1, 2). The last one is an intratemporal relationship between
consumption, the husband’s leisure and the wife’s leisure.
3If we also take home production into consideration, the wife’s reservation wage for labor supply
could fall according to the husband’s unemployment and his increased time for home production. The
realization of the wife’s lower reservation wage raises her labor supply in the market.
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can sacrifice their leisure and afford working time to compensate for their husbands’ job
loss.
We can thus test the existence of the AWE, examining if wives’ labor hours increase
as their husbands lose their jobs involuntarily. We can regress changes in wives’ labor
hours, ΔWLit, on the variables including husbands’ job loss, HUit, such as
ΔWLit = α0HUit +
∑
j=1
αjHUit−j +ΔXitδ + εit (1)
where i is a household and t is a survey year (i = 1, ...N, t = 1, ..., Ti). WL is wives’
paid labor hours, HU is a dummy variable indicating whether or not husbands lost jobs
involuntarily, and X is a matrix of the other households’ characteristics.4 This is a general
specification that the existing literature has examined. We mainly estimate this equation,
with appropriate modifications utilizing our panel data sets.
We write the error components as εit = μi + νt + uit, where μi ∼ IID(0, σ2μ), νt ∼
IID(0, σ2ν), and uit ∼ IID(0, σ2u). E(μiuit) = 0, E(uituis) = 0 for all i and t = s. uit is
orthogonal to all the explanatory variables in X. The null hypothesis is no existence of
the AWE; α0 = 0. That is, the wife does not alter her labor supply in the year when her
husband loses his job, so that the household can pool the shock of job loss.
Note that a husband’s resigning from a job, but not an unexpected job loss, could be
4Unless consumption and the wife’s leisure are additively separable in the utility function, changes
in a wife’s leisure are influenced by the substitutability or complementarity between her leisure and
consumption. We assume an additive separability and do not treat households’ simultaneous decisions
on consumption and leisure explicitly. As mentioned later, we cannot find any significant effect of con-
sumption changes on wives’ leisure changes, even if we include consumption changes as an explanatory
variable. Further consideration of simultaneous decisions between consumption and leisure remains for
future research.
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endogenous in a decision regarding a wife’s labor supply. As previous literature points
out, the more hours a wife works, the more easily the husband may choose to resign from
a job. This is not the AWE. In order to avoid this endogeneity problem, we first take HU
as involuntary job loss but not job resignation.
As another treatment, we regress the changes in wives’ labor time but not its levels
on the husbands’ job loss. That is, we examine the wives’ reaction to the husbands’
job loss but not a simple relationship between the length of the wife’s labor time and
her husband’s unemployment condition. Examining dynamic changes but not levels of
wives’ labor hours has additional merit that we can remove the problem of time-invariant
omitted variables.5
In the equation (1), there may be a time lag between husbands’ involuntary job loss,
HUit−j (j ≥ 1), and wives’ reaction. In this case, the coefficients of αj (j ≥ 1) can be
positive. However, the sign of αj (j ≥ 1) can be positive even if there is no time-lagged
AWE. Suppose that wives respond to their husbands’ job loss in the same year: t is the
year in this paper, and there exists a within-one-year AWE. Also suppose that wives’
labor hours are shorter in this year as their labor hours were longer in the previous year:
wives’ labor hours are negatively correlated between years.6 When a husband loses his
job in a given year, his wife will increase her labor supply in the same year, which in
turn decrease her labor supply in the following year. If wives’ labor hours are positively
correlated between years, wives will raise their labor supply in the following year. That is,
without a time-lagged effect of husbands’ job loss, the signs of the coefficient on husbands’
5We attempted to analyze the levels (length) of wives’ labor hours, and found the same implication
for the existence of the AWE as shown in the present paper.
6Wives’ labor hours actually have negative time dependencies in our sample.
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past job loss, αj, could become positive, zero or even negative depending on the existence
of a within-one-year AWE and time dependencies in wives’ labor hours. Thus, we can
test at least the existence of within-one-year AWE by α0, while we cannot always test the
existence of the time-lagged AWE by αj (j ≥ 1).
It is important to deal with time dependency in wives’ labor hours properly if there are
any, even when we test the existence of within-one-year AWE. We can include wives’ past
labor hour changes, ΔWLit−k (k ≥ 1), explicitly as explanatory variables in the equation
(1). The coefficients on ΔWLit−k (k ≥ 1) are positive, negative or zero depending on
the relationships of wives’ labor hours between years. This estimation, however, raises a
problem of autocorrelation, since the model now includes lagged dependent variables on
the right-hand side. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we take the first difference to
remove individual fixed effects and conduct GMM estimation of
ΔWLit = α0HUit +
∑
j=1
αjHUit−j +
∑
k
βkΔWLit−k +ΔXitδ +Δεit (2)
with appropriate instruments of Z = [Z ′1, Z
′
2, · · · , Z ′N ]′ where E(Z ′iΔεi) = 0. The possible
instruments are WLi1, · · · ,WLit−2, x′i1, · · · , x′it for ΔWLit−1, where xi is a vector of all
the exogenous variables in Xit.
There are additional considerations regarding this specification. First, there may be a
problem of multicollinearity between husbands’ past job loss, HUit−j (j ≥ 1) and wives’
past labor hour changes, WLit−k (k ≥ 1). Therefore, we examine the case excluding
husbands’ past job loss from the explanatory variables. Second, we include the amount of
financial asset holdings one year before the time period of labor hour changes in Xit. This
can be important since family decisions on labor supply could be related to the behavior
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of its precautionary savings. Households’ precautionary behaviors may differ, which then
affects wives’ reaction to husbands’ employment shocks. We include the amounts of
savings accumulated by the end of the previous year, Sit, as an additional explanatory
variable in (1) and (2). The amount of savings, Sit, might be endogenous: E(Sitεis) = 0
∀ s ≤ t, since the wife’s labor decisions may affect the household saving decisions, or
unobserved components in the error term may be correlated with amounts of savings. In
this case, the instruments are WLi1, · · · ,WLit−2, Si1, · · · , Sit−2, x′i1, · · · , x′it for ΔWLit−1.
Controlled variables in Xit are mostly based on the past literature testing the AWE,
such as family needs and a wife’s age. Time-invariant variables are dropped by the first-
difference operation. The interaction terms with a wife’s educational attainments are
included, as educational attainments may be essential factors in the Japanese household’s
economic decisions. We can simply estimate (1) if there is no time dependency in the
wife’s labor hours, while we should estimate (2) if there is.7
3 The Data
The present paper uses the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC, hereafter) con-
ducted by the Institute for Household Economy in Japan. This is one of the few panel
data sets in Japan. The survey questions women aged between 24 and 34 in the starting
7In order to control for differences in risks surrounding households, we estimated the model including
income or consumption variances over the past four years within a household. Inclusion of them does
not alter the implications of the following results at all. We also controlled for consumption changes
as an endogenous explanatory variable, and the coefficient on consumption changes was not statistically
significant while the exogeneity was accepted.
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year of 1993. The women are asked about their families and themselves in regard to
labor status including questions about job change, income, occupation and labor hours,
consumption and saving behavior, and asset holdings.
The survey collects detailed information on job changes by the husband during the
previous year. Using the survey information, we can identify those husbands who lost
their jobs at least once during the previous year between the last survey and the present
survey. The reason why we limit this to one year is that most unemployed in Japan start
working within a year after they lose a job.8 We can further distinguish whether or not
the job loss was involuntary by looking at the reasons for it. Involuntary reasons include
being laid off, the plant closing, or bankruptcy.
The JSPC asks respondents separate questions about their paid regular working hours,
their paid overtime working hours, and their unpaid overtime working hours per week.
We sum paid regular and overtime working hours because we are interested in looking at
whether the wife compensates for the husband’s negative shocks. An increase in unpaid
working hours does not mean compensation for the husband’s loss. The defined working
hours are zero for non-workers. This may cause a nonlinearity in dependent variables,
since the changes in labor hours for working wives may be different from those for non-
working wives. To check this possibility, we took the log of changes in wives’ labor hours
and conducted the same estimation, but the sign and significance were unchanged.9
8We do not divide a year into shorter time periods, since it decreases the number of households who
experienced the husband’s unexpected job loss. We also do not utilize the information on unemployed
periods, since the characteristics of such a limited number of households make the results unstable.
9The present paper includes non-workers together with workers, since we do not want to loose the
information on changes from non-workers to workers. We cannot conduct the empirical estimation for
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As expected, factors other than complementarity with the husband’s job loss could also
cause an increase in the wife’s labor supply. For example, if the wife’s firm is growing or
if she is promoted as her job tenure increases, her working hours may increase. To control
for these effects, we include the wife’s age and the interaction of several characteristics
with educational attainment as control variables. As mentioned, time-invariant variables,
such as wives’ educational attainments and time-invariant characteristics of their working
environments, are dropped by the first-difference operation. Other controlled variables
are the number of children, and the stock of saving (the outstanding balance of savings
accounts and holdings of securities) at each survey point.
Twelve waves of the JPSC, from 1993 till 2004, are available, but our estimation
uses (at most) nine differenced periods from 1995–96 to 2003–04. This is because two-
year lagged information is needed to instrument for the first-differenced transformation of
one-year lagged wife’s labor hours. The sample is also limited to married women, to the
non-self-employed sample, and to the sample containing sufficient variables required in the
regressions. The total number of observation is 4212 (884 households) for the estimation
under an assumption of exogenous financial assets, and 4052 (856 households) under an
assumption of endogenous financial assets. The descriptive statistics are summarized in
Table 1.
Before introducing the estimation results, we first overview the movements of hus-
bands’ and wives’ employment rates in Japan, using our JPSC data. According to Figure
1, husbands’ and wives’ employment rates move in opposite directions, suggesting the
non-workers because of insufficient observations. We will discuss the difference between non-workers and
workers later at the end of the Results section.
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possibility that wives’ labor supply is complementary to husbands’ job loss. In our sam-
ple, about 1.5% of the households experienced the husband’s involuntary job loss during
the previous year, between 1993 and 2004. This small percentage is close to what the
macro statistics show: the unemployment rate of household heads was about 1.5% in 1999
according to the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (Statistics Bureau).
The JPSC asks about income sources when the husband was laid off, which is listed in
Table 2. Although 40% do not have unemployment periods, a quite high percentage
answers wife’s or parent’s income. The wife’s labor may be an important candidate for
complementing the husband’s labor. Savings may be another important income source
for unemployed households. In the following regressions, we estimate the effect of the
husband’s involuntary job loss on the wife’s labor supply after controlling for household
savings.
4 The Results
4.1 Does the AWE exist in Japan?
Table 3 summarizes the results using a fixed-effects model including husbands’ job loss.10
Column (1) does not include their past job loss, and columns (2) to (4) do include one-,
two-, and three-year lagged effects. Either result shows that the husbands’ job loss during
the previous year has a positive effect in the present year. This is statistically significant
mostly at the 5% significance level. The coefficient on husbands’ job loss in the previous
year (which occurred from 12 to 24 months before) is negative and significant at the 1%
10We also attempted a random-effects model and found the same implications.
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level, the two-year lagged job loss is negative and significant at the 10% level, but the
three-year lagged job loss is insignificant. As mentioned before in the model, the negative
effects of the husbands’ past job loss do not deny the existence of the wives’ added worker
effect. If wives’ labor hours in the previous year were responsive to that year’s husbands’
job loss, and if wives’ labor hours had persistence, the negative sign would be expected.
The results in Table 3 suggest that wives’ added worker effect exists in Japan.
In order to take account of persistences in wives’ labor hours over time, Table 4 shows
the results of GMM estimation including wives’ lagged labor hour changes.11 Columns
(1a) and (1b) in Table 4 drop the husbands’ job loss in the previous year, while columns
(2a) and (2b) include it, and columns (3a) and (3b) include additionally the two-year
lagged job loss. We do not show the results including three-year lagged job loss, since
this is not statistically significant in any estimation. The difference between (a) and (b)
is whether or not we include the previous year’s financial asset holdings.
In either estimation, the husbands’ job loss coefficient in the present year is positive
and significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, husbands’ job loss in the previous years
mostly become statistically insignificant even at the 10% level. That is, if we control for
dynamic persistence of wives’ labor hours, we cannot find a negative effect for husbands’
past job loss, while we still have a positive effect of husbands’ job loss on the wives’ labor
hours in the present year. The husbands’ job loss increases the wives’ paid labor hours
11Simply including the lagged dependent variables in the estimation of Table 3 raises a problem of
autocorrelation: modified Durbin-Watson statistics in the case including wives’ past labor hour changes
are 1.863, 1.866, 1.865 and 1.866 respectively for columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Table 3, implying
existence of AR(1) serial correlation.
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by about 2.1–2.8 hours per week. There exists at least within-one-year AWE in Japan.
As another important point, the coefficients on changes in financial asset holdings
in this year and the previous year are negative and significant at the 1% level. This
suggests that labor supply and savings should be substitutes, and households with more
savings supply less labor and more leisure. This may suggest the importance of taking
account of precautionary saving behaviors in explaining households’ decisions. We found
the same implication even when taking financial asset holdings as endogenous variables:
the coefficients on the present husbands’ job loss are 2.05, 2.28 and 2.44, respectively
in (1b), (2b) and (3b), and all of them are statistically significant at least at the 12%
level; the coefficients on the previous year’s husbands’ job loss are not significant; and
the coefficients on wives’ paid labor hour changes in the past years are all the same signs,
size, and significance, as is shown in Table 4.12
As for the specification, the wives’ labor hour changes in the past years are negative
and significant at the 1% level. It is important to consider dynamic persistence of wives’
labor hours. We show the results including only one- and two-year lags, as we do not find
any statistically significant effect of more lagged values. As for other significant variables,
households with more children decrease the wife’s labor hours. This is a natural result
for mothers’ labor supply.
The estimation models in table 4 satisfy over-identification conditions and there is
no second-order serial correlation for the disturbances of the first-differenced equation
(E(ΔuitΔuit−2) = 0). Because our estimation is derived from about 1000 households over
12The present paper points out the importance of households’ precautionary savings but does not deal
with it explicitly. More detailed investigation should be considered in future research.
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a maximum of nine years, an Arellano-Bond GMM estimator may have a finite-sample
downward bias, as usually criticized. So, we conducted one-step GMM estimation and
found that the coefficients on the husbands’ job loss are 3.55, 4.05 and 3.58, and all of them
are statistically significant at least at the 5% level, respectively for (1b), (2b) and (3b).
The husbands’ previous year’s job loss are not statistically significant and the wives’ past
labor hour changes are negative and significant, which are all the same as the implications
in Table 4. Wives raise their labor hours in response to their husbands’ involuntary job
loss by 3–4 hours per week.
It might be surprising that wives reacted to their husbands’ job loss during a severe
recession in Japan. During a recession, there may be a discouraged worker effect such that
wives do not try to supply labor because of fewer employment opportunities. Even in such
state of the economy, there are possible reasons why we found wives’ positive labor supply
responses. First, our definition of the husband’s involuntary job loss is job loss during the
previous one year, which includes not only a present condition of unemployment but also
experiences of unemployment during the previous one year between the last survey and
the next survey. Wives’ responses may look rapid but they actually include responses one
year after their husbands’ job loss. Second, the job loss of a husband, who is usually the
main income earner, may give a severe shock to a household. Serious economic conditions
during this sample period made households expect the shock to last rather a long time,
lowering their life-time wealth. Third, there was indeed surplus labor in many families in
Japan. As is well known, the rate of labor participation of married women is low and their
labor hours are short in Japan. The changes in the labor market, where many full-time
jobs were replaced by part-time jobs during the recession of post mid-1990, may have
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motivated them to participate in the labor market.
4.2 Who raises working hours?
We found that many Japanese wives actively reacted to their husbands’ job loss. Did
working wives raise their labor hours? Or did nonworking wives start working? Table
5 summarizes how either working wives or nonworking wives reacted to their husbands’
involuntary job loss. Although we do not have a sufficiently large sample to examine
empirically the changes in nonworking wives’ job status, the table shows an interesting
feature. First, the wives who experienced their husbands’ involuntary job loss raised their
paid working hours much more than those who did not: the paid working hours increased
by 0.90 hours on average for those without job loss but by 4.12 hours for those with
job loss. Panel A shows the working hour changes for the wives who had worked in the
previous year. Among them, those who experienced the husbands’ involuntary job loss
raised their paid working hours by 0.75 hours (45 minutes) per week, although the wives
who did not experience their husbands’ job loss indeed decreased their working hours by
1.5 hours per week during the sample period from 1993 to 2004.
Panel B shows the changes for the wives who had not worked in the previous year.
Those who experienced their husbands’ job loss raised their working hours by 8.6 hours
per week, which is three times more than those who did not. 33% among previously
nonworking wives started working, while only 13.5% of those who did not face their
husbands’ job loss started working. Furthermore, previously nonworking wives who faced
their husbands’ job loss started seeking work more frequently. The percentage of wives
who started working or seeking jobs is more than twice as much as those without husbands’
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involuntary job loss. These statistics emphasize that the AWE exists, and the potential
AWE could be even larger.
Japanese wives’ labor supply responds to their husbands’ job loss. During the high
unemployment period following the mid-1990s, there existed the added worker effect not
only for working wives’ labor hours but also for nonworking wives’ new labor supply.
The added worker effect could be greater, including a larger potential labor supply in the
market.
The married female labor supply seems more flexible than we expect. Although most
of the economic literature on households’ behaviors focuses on consumption but not on
the labor (leisure) decisions, we should take leisure into account when we describe the
behavior and welfare of economic agents.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined how a wife’s labor supply responded to her husband’s in-
voluntary job loss following the mid-1990s. We utilized panel data containing extensive
household information, which are indispensable for our analysis. This makes it possible
for us to investigate wives’ leisure decisions as well as households’ savings behavior against
unexpected shocks. Furthermore, our sample period (1993–2004) included a period when
Japan’s unemployment rates were very high and growing, which was advantageous when
analyzing behavioral responses to changed economic conditions.
We found that a wife’s labor supply was actually stimulated by her husband’s involun-
tary job loss. The additional statistics indicate that not only working wives raised their
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labor hours but also nonworking wives began to participate in the labor market. In ad-
dition, nonworking wives started looking for jobs in response to their husband’s job loss.
There exists an added worker effect during a period of job insecurity in Japan following
the mid-1990s, and the effect would be larger if we included potential labor supply.
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Figure1. Husband's and Wife's employment rates
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
94 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04
Year
Wf's employment
rate
0.9
0.95
1
Hs's employment
rate
Husband's  employment rate
Wife's  employment rate
Table1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean StandardDeviation Min Max
Wife's paid labor hours 14.6802 16.8642 0 65
Wife's paid labor hours in the last year 13.7352 16.6856 0 65
Husband's job loss 0.0150 0.1214 0 1
Husband's job loss in the last year 0.0138 0.1165 0 1
Husband's job loss 2 years before 0.0140 0.1175 0 1
Husband's job loss 3 years before 0.0131 0.1135 0 1
Financial asset holdings 445.4084 738.4616 0 8700
Wife's age 36.6833 4.1134 28 46
Wife's age * wife low education 18.6880 18.4898 0 46
Number of children 1.9839 0.8838 0 7
Number of children * wife low education 1.0527 1.2124 0 7
[after taking the first difference]
△Wife's paid labor hour in the last year 0.9450 10.2127 -65 65
△Financial asset holdings 11.6453 398.3604 -7300 6900
△Number of children 0.0427 0.2213 -2 2
△Number of children * wife low education 0.0176 0.1515 -2 2
Note. Total number of the observations to be used for the main estimations is 4212.
Table2.  The Source of Living after the Husbands' Job loss
Savings 39.68%
No unemployed periods 34.92%
Retirement allowance or unemployment insurance 28.57%
Wife's income or transfers from parents 23.81%
Borrowings or use of credit card 3.17%
Others 4.76%
Table 3. Wives' Reaction to the Husbands' Job Loss (1)
Dependent variable: Wife's paid labor hour changes from the previous year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2.7639 * 2.3580 ** 2.1240 ** 2.1716 **
(1.5949) (1.6010) (1.6302) (1.6298)
-2.8198 *** -3.0518 *** -2.9066 ***
(1.8510) (1.8527) (1.8619)
-1.2841 * -1.1523 *
(1.9381) 1.9689)
0.8952
(2.1491)
-0.0008 ** -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0008 ***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
0.0903 0.0924 0.0918 0.0919
(0.1313) (0.1311) (0.1311) (0.1310)
-0.1607 -0.1556 -0.1520 -0.1529
(0.1599) (0.1597) (0.1596) (0.1598)
-3.3595 *** -3.4138 *** -3.3777 *** -3.3808 ***
(1.0407) (1.0404) (1.0366) (1.0365)
0.8525 0.9040 0.8789 0.8735
(1.8136) (1.8145) (1.8130) (1.8128)
0.4765 0.3422 0.3312 0.3266
(3.7367) (3.7384) (3.7446) (3.7437)
Number of the observations 4212 4212 4212 4212
Number of the individuals 884 884 884 884
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
F stat. for all the exclusion restrictions 2.14*** 2.16*** 2.04** 1.92**
F stat. for no individual effects 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Notes.1. Fixed effects model is applied to all the estimations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
          2. Asterisks, *, **, *** show that the variable is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
          3. All the estimation models include year dummy variables for 1995-2004.
          4. Wife's labor hour changes, Financial asset holdings, Number of children are changes from the last year.
          5. Modified Durbin-Watson Statistics are 2.309, 2.313, 2.312 and 2.313 respectively in (1), (2), (3) and (4),
              which imply no AR1  serial correlations at 5% significance level (Table II in Bhargava et al. (1982)). 
Husband's job loss
Husband's job loss in the last year
Husband's job loss 2 years before
Husband's job loss 3 years before
Wife's age * Wife's low educational attainment
Number of children
Constant
Financial asset holdings
Wife's age
Number of children * Wife's low educational attainment
Table 4. Wives' Reaction to the Husbands' Job Loss (2): Dynamic model
Dependent variable: Wife's paid labor hour changes from the last year
2.8083 *** 2.0524 *** 2.5493 *** 2.2766 *** 2.2372 *** 2.4443 ***
(1.3796) (1.3019) (1.5209) (1.4391) (1.5178) (1.4418)
-0.6182 0.4686 -1.1599 * 0.7386
(1.3387) (1.1989) (1.3712) (1.3121)
-1.0415 0.1911
(1.5953) (1.4449)
-0.2914 *** -0.2907 *** -0.2913 *** -0.2905 *** -0.2911 *** -0.2896 ***
(0.0234) (0.0214) (0.0234) (0.0214) (0.0234) (0.0213)
-0.1027 *** -0.0897 *** -0.1030 *** -0.0897 *** -0.1031 *** -0.0893 ***
(0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0171)
-0.0007 ** -0.0002 *** -0.0007 ** -0.0002 *** -0.0007 ** -0.0002 ***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
-0.0004 ** -0.0004 ** -0.0004 **
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.0803 0.1157 0.0838 0.1174 0.0757 0.1057
(0.6971) (0.5564) (0.6928) (0.5525) (0.6920) (0.5530)
0.1362 0.0633 0.1360 0.0679 0.1440 0.0746
(0.1771) (0.1683) (0.1771) (0.1684) (0.1775) (0.1691)
-2.2351 *** -2.0300 *** -2.2489 *** -2.0267 *** -2.2551 *** -2.0573 ***
(0.7459) (0.7478) (0.7447) (0.7461) (0.7437) (0.7456)
0.4032 0.7720 0.4192 0.7766 0.4330 * 0.8168
(1.3096) (1.2583) (1.3094) (1.2581) (1.3081) (1.2581)
-0.0725 0.0709 -0.0843 0.0675 -0.0919 0.0779
(0.8381) (0.5456) (0.8347) (0.5417) (0.8334) (0.5420)
Number of the observations 4212 4052 4212 4052 4212 4052
Number of the individuals 884 856 884 856 884 856
Wald-test for  all the exclusion restrictions 210.36 *** 237.46 *** 211.55 *** 237.27 *** 212.14 *** 236.69 ***
Sargan's OID test 50.00 101.35 49.88 101.48 49.73 101.9
Test for E (ΔuitΔuit-2) = 0 0.51 0.11 0.52 0.11 0.53 0.12
Notes. 1. To treat dynamic aspects of wife's labor supply, we conduct GMM estimations (Arellano- Bond (1991)).
           2.  All the estimations include year dummy variables for 1995-2004.
           3. Instruments used in the estimation (1) are two-year-lagged wife's labor hours, and levels and lagged variables of all the other explanatory variables.
               Those in the estimation (2) are two-year-lagged wife's labor hours, two or more lagged husband's job loss, and all the other explanatory variables.
           4. See the notes in Table3. 
(3a) (3b)
Husband's job loss 2 years before
(2b)(1a) (2a)(1b)
Husband's job loss
Wife's paid labor hour changes 2 years before
Husband's job loss in the previous year
Constant
Wife's paid labor hour changes  in the previous year
Financial asset holdings
Wife's age
Wife's age * Wife low educational attainment
Number of children * wife low educational
attainment
Number of children
Financial asset holdings in the previous year
Table 5. Who Raised Working Hours?
The Entire Households Without  husband's job-loss With husband's job-loss
Mean (Standard Deviation) Mean (Standard Deviation) Mean (Standard Deviation)
Changes in wife's paid working hours from the previous year
0.945 (10.213) 0.897 (10.179) 4.119 (11.901)
Panel A: for the wife who was working in the last year
Changes in paid working hours -1.460 (11.263) -1.502 (11.308) 0.750 (8.421)
Panel B: for the wife who was not working in the last year
Changes in paid working hours 2.958 (8.750) 2.891 (8.645) 8.611 (14.339)
% Started working 13.76% 13.52% 33.33%
[as a full time worker] 8.30% 8.18% 12.50%
% Started working or Seeking Jobs 14.72% 14.45% 37.04%
Note. We summarize characteristics  for the estimated samples; the number of the entire observations is 4212. The family who faced 
 the husband's job-loss is 1.50%.
